James Griffith, an officer
working in Financial crimes cell of London
Police, was having business as usual over a cup of coffee in his office till he
got a call from his senior which moved the earth beneath his feet and his eyes
were about to pop out as he muttered in his bewilderment ’Oh my!!!! Go..........d!” It was bigger than anything
he had handled earlier and his imagination failed to gauge the impact of reason
of this amazement. To quote very conservatively it is a 15 digit number; 350,000,000,000,000,
precisely 350 trillion USD and this humongous amount was riding on a rigged
benchmark. Yes, It was none other than LIBOR the most prominent benchmark used globally
on which the best of Investment banks and Hedge funds quote their Floating
rates and premier banks fix their lending rates. This did not happen anytime
soon but as early as 2006. This was indeed scandalous than many other recent
scandals!
Read the below:
These are some of the mails
between traders who betted on LIBOR and submitters who submitted LIBOR to
British bankers Association (BBA) daily.
“WE HAVE TO GET KICKED OUT
OF THE FIXINGS TOMORROW!! We need a 4.17 fix in 1m (low fix) We need a 4.41 fix
in 3m (high fix)” (November 22, 2005, Senior Trader in New York to Trader in
London);
“You
need to take a close look at the reset ladder. We need 3M to stay low for the
next 3 sets and then I think that we will be completely out of our 3M position.
Then its on. [Submitter] has to go crazy with raising 3M Libor.” (February 1,
2006, Trader in New York to Trader in London);
“Your
annoying colleague again … Would love to get a high 1m Also if poss a low 3m …
if poss … thanks” (February 3, 2006, Trader in London to Submitter);
“This
is the [book's] risk. We need low 1M and 3M libor. PIs ask [submitter] to get
1M set to 82. That would help a lot” (March 27, 2006, Trader in New York to
Trader in London);…
“Hi
Guys, We got a big position in 3m libor for the next 3 days. Can we please keep
the lib or fixing at 5.39 for the next few days. It would really help. We do
not want it to fix any higher than that. Tks a lot.” (September 13, 2006,
Senior Trader in New York to Submitter)…”
The
fundamental principle underlying floating rates is to allow the market to
determine borrowing costs. Customers who borrow on a floating-rate basis, if
they are sensible, and institutions that loan money on a floating-rate basis,
if they are ethical, therefore expect two things from a benchmark interest
rate. First, the benchmark should reflect actual conditions in the financial
markets. That means no random fluctuations -- money costs what it is worth.
Second, the benchmark rate should not be easy to manipulate. No rational,
informed borrower would borrow money at a variable rate of interest and then
empower the lender to determine when and how the interest rate changed in the
future.
So
it is startling that Libor, the financial world's most important number,
satisfies neither of these requirements. Libor is computed by the British
Bankers' Association (BBA), a powerful trade association based in London that
represents more than 250 financial institutions. These banks are located in 50
countries and have operations in just about every corner of the globe. But
instead of using actual market rates, big banks estimate the interest rate that
they think they would have to pay if they borrowed money from other
institutions. That is different than reporting the actual interest rate at
which they are really borrowing from other banks.
Each
day, the BBA sets Libor rates for 15 loan maturities in ten different
currencies. In the case of the dollar, 18 banks submit their hypothetical
borrowing costs. The BBA discards the four highest and the four lowest submissions
considered as outliers distorting the calculation, and then averages the
remaining ten to come up with the Libor number. Thompson Reuters calculates all
of these rates for the BBA, and then publishes the results, usually around
11:45 AM (CET).
Rate
setting desk were acceding to the traders request and sending the artificial
low or high rates to BBA. A low rate quoted to BBA is aimed at keeping the rate
so low that it’s taken as outlier and excluded from average rates. This resulted
in a lower number forming part of average which would otherwise would have been
excluded. Therefore the overall rate was lower than what it could have been
with fair play. Though the average was impacted by few basis points, yet the
mammoth magnitude of money riding on LIBOR made the outcome substantial.
There
are plenty of reasons why banks would like to manipulate Libor rates. During
the height of the financial crisis, regulators foolishly looked to Libor to
determine the market's perception of the health of big banks. A big bank
reporting a low Libor rate was thought to be able to borrow money from other
banks cheaply and, therefore, was seen as a safe place to invest. Banks worried
about attracting the attention of regulators may have submitted low Libor rates
in order to try to deflect regulatory scrutiny.
More
nefariously, banks also manipulated Libor to make money or avoid losses on
their trading portfolios. For example, when U.S. traders at Barclays wanted
Libor to rise in order to draw a bigger profit on some of their financial
products, they simply asked their colleagues at the rate-setting desk in London
to push the numbers up or down to suit their needs. Barclays would then submit
artificial bids and persuade their counterparts at other banks to do the same.